Home
Search results “Cryptographic checksum function in oracle”
21. Cryptography: Hash Functions
 
01:22:01
MIT 6.046J Design and Analysis of Algorithms, Spring 2015 View the complete course: http://ocw.mit.edu/6-046JS15 Instructor: Srinivas Devadas In this lecture, Professor Devadas covers the basics of cryptography, including desirable properties of cryptographic functions, and their applications to security. License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA More information at http://ocw.mit.edu/terms More courses at http://ocw.mit.edu
Views: 77228 MIT OpenCourseWare
Pigeonhole Principle and Hash Functions (Statistics Examples 5)
 
04:39
Applying the pigeonhole principle to (cryptographic) hash functions to determine how many inputs collide on a single hash value.
Views: 1425 Steven Gordon
6.875 (Cryptography) L17: Hash Functions, Random Oracles
 
01:19:53
6.875 (Cryptography & Cryptanalysis), Spring 2018 Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Views: 259 Andrew Xia
Cryptographic Reverse Firewall via Malleable Smooth Projective Hash Functions
 
31:25
Rongmao Chen and Yi Mu and Guomin Yang and Willy Susilo and Fuchun Guo and Mingwu Zhang. Talk at Asiacrypt 2016. See http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=27898
Views: 190 TheIACR
How to use Oracle SHA 256 Bit & 512 Bit Data Encryption Algorithms?
 
07:21
Function And Java Class You Can get from Below Link... https://github.com/arulxaviers/Oracle_PLSQL_SHA_256_512_Encryption A Complete Brief Video about How to use Oracle Database Encryption By Using SHA 256 Bit & 512 Bit Algorithms? How to use Oracle SHA 256 Bit & 512 Bit Data Encryption Algorithms? Oracle Data Encryption Database Encryption dbms_crypto.hash example 11g dbms_crypto.hash sha256 dbms_crypto.hash invalid identifier dbms_crypto.hash 12c dbms_crypto.encrypt example encryption and decryption in oracle 11g sys.dbms_crypto.hash example SHA 256 Bit SHA 512 Bit Encryption
Views: 1747 Oracle PL/SQL World
Hashing: Why & How?
 
16:35
Why do we wish to reduce a long list to a short one? How to do it, so that the short list will identify the long list. How to do it so that it is impossible to identify the long list from the short one, and the implications of the fact that many long lists share the very same short list. Hashing configurations: straight encryption, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2.
Views: 145851 Gideon Samid
Leftover Hash Lemma, Revisited (Crypto 2011)
 
22:10
Talk at Crypto 2011, August 15, 2011. Boaz Barak, Yevgeniy Dodis, Hugo Krawczyk, Olivier Pereira, Krzysztof Pietrzak, François-Xavier Standaert, and Yu Yu Microsoft Research New England; New York University; IBM Research; Université Catholique de Louvain; CWI Amsterdam; Université Catholique de Louvain;and East China Normal University Abstract. The famous Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) states that (almost) universal hash functions are good randomness extractors. Despite its numerous applications, LHL-based extractors suffer from the following two drawbacks: Large Entropy Loss: to extract $v$ bits from distribution $X$ of min-entropy $m$ which are $\epsilon$-close to uniform, one must set $v \le m - 2*\log(1/\epsilon)$, meaning that the entropy loss $L = m-v \ge 2*\log(1/\epsilon)$. Large Seed Length: the seed length $n$ of (almost) universal hash function required by the LHL must be at least $n \ge \min(u-v, v + 2*\log(1/\epsilon))-O(1)$, where $u$ is the length of the source. Quite surprisingly, we show that both limitations of the LHL — large entropy loss and large seed — can often be overcome (or, at least, mitigated) in various quite general scenarios. First, we show that entropy loss could be reduced to $L = \log (1/\epsilon)$ for the setting of deriving secret keys for a wide range of cryptographic applications. Specifically, the security of these schemes with an LHL-derived key gracefully degrades from $\epsilon$ to at most $\epsilon+\sqrt{\epsilon 2^{-L}}$. (Notice that, unlike standard LHL, this bound is meaningful even when one extracts more bits than the min-entropy we have!) Based on these results we build a general computational extractor that enjoys low entropy loss and can be used to instantiate a generic key derivation function for any cryptographic application. Second, we study the soundness of the natural expand-then-extract approach, where one uses a pseudorandom generator (PRG) to expand a short "input seed" $S$ into a longer "output seed" $S'$, and then use the resulting $S'$ as the seed required by the LHL (or, more generally, by any randomness extractor). We show that, in general, the expand-then extract approach is not sound if the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption is true. Despite that, we show that it is sound either: (1) when extracting a "small" (logarithmic in the security of the PRG) number of bits; or (2) in minicrypt. Implication (2) suggests that the expand-then-extract approach is likely secure when used with "practical" PRGs, despite lacking a reductionist proof of security! See http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=23565
Views: 1743 TheIACR
2017-10-11 CERIAS - Memory Hard Functions and Password Hashing
 
54:17
Recorded: 10/11/2017 CERIAS Security Seminar at Purdue UniversityMemory Hard Functions and Password HashingJeremiah BlockiIn the last few years breaches at organizations like Yahoo!, Dropbox, Lastpass, AshleyMadison and Adult FriendFinder have exposed billions of user passwords to offline brute-force attacks. Password hashing algorithms are a critical last line of defense against an offline attacker who has stolen password hash values from an authentication server. An attacker who has stolen a user\'s password hash value can attempt to crack each user\'s password offline by comparing the hashes of likely password guesses with the stolen hash value. Because the attacker can check each guess offline it is no longer possible to lockout the adversary after several incorrect guesses. The attacker is limited only by the cost of computing the hash function. Offline attacks are increasingly commonplace and dangerous due to weak password selection and improved cracking hardware such as a GPU, Field Programmable Gate Array \(FPGA\) or an Application Specific Integrated Circuit \(ASIC\). A secure password hashing algorithm should have the properties that \(1\) it can be computed quickly \(e.g., at most one second\) on a personal computer, \(2\) it is prohibitively expensive for an attacker to compute the function millions or billions of times to crack the user\'s password even if the attacker uses customized hardware. The first property ensures that the password hashing algorithm does not introduce an intolerably long delay for the user during authentication, and the second property ensures that an offline attacker will fail to crack most user passwords. Memory hard functions \(MHFs\), functions whose computation require a large amount of memory, are a promising cryptographic primitive to enable the design of a password hashing algorithm achieving both goals. The talk will introduce and motivate the notion of memory hard functions and survey recent advances in the theory of MHFs. These results include \(1\) an attack on the Argon2i MHF, winner of the password hashing competition, which could reduce an amortized costs for a password attacker, \(2\) security lower bound for SCRYPT MHF and \(3\) construction of the first provably secure data-independent memory hard function. \(Visit: www.cerias.purdue.edu\)
Views: 235 ceriaspurdue
ThinkQuest Winners Hash That Talks About Cryptography
 
04:10
ThinkQuest (http://tinyurl.com/4vla8f) is an international competition sponsored by Oracle Education Foundation that challenges teams of students to create innovative and educational Web sites to share with the world. Hear Hash That, the 2nd place winner in the Under-19 category, discuss their winning entry on cryptography titled 'Can you keep that a secret?' http://tinyurl.com/475eha
Views: 601 jeanettetan2008
Applying Java’s Cryptography
 
58:54
Learn how to control Java’s cryptographic features to protect your application and any data that you manage. This session explains what different cryptography features do, what threats are addressed by each feature, and where the configuration takes place. Topics include certificates, code signatures, authenticating dynamic JVM languages, TLS control, perfect forward security, and transparent JPA encryption. Author: Erik Costlow Erik Costlow is a product manager in Oracle's Java Platform Group and a regular contributor to the Java Platform Group PM blog. Erik also works closely with industry on Oracle's Java Root Certificate Program to ensure highest program quality. Previously Erik was employed at HP where he influenced design of the Fortify security analysis suite used by software developers across the world. View more trainings by Erik Costlow at https://www.parleys.com/author/erik-costlow Find more related tutorials at https://www.parleys.com/category/developer-training-tutorials
Views: 11796 Oracle Developers
Cryptographic Hash Function Solution - Applied Cryptography
 
02:23
This video is part of an online course, Applied Cryptography. Check out the course here: https://www.udacity.com/course/cs387.
Views: 1579 Udacity
Strong Collision Resistance - Applied Cryptography
 
05:06
This video is part of an online course, Applied Cryptography. Check out the course here: https://www.udacity.com/course/cs387.
Views: 6726 Udacity
High-Speed Cryptography in Java: X25519, Poly1305, and EdDSA
 
38:35
Adam Petcher, Principal Member of Technical Staff, Oracle JDK 11 includes support for the first of a new breed of cryptographic algorithm that features improved performance, trustworthiness, and security in cloud and multitenant environments. This session describes the features and implementations of some of these algorithms: X25519 key agreement, Poly1305 authentication, and EdDSA signatures. The presentation focuses on the techniques used to develop high-performance, secure implementations of modern cryptographic algorithms in Java. No knowledge of cryptography is required, and the session should be relevant to anyone who is interested in Java performance.
Views: 440 Oracle Developers
Network security by Hash function
 
05:30
Network Security by depatment of computer science
Views: 877 skywalk309
High-Speed Cryptography in Java: X25519, Poly1305, and EdDSA
 
38:35
Adam Petcher, Principal Member of Technical Staff, Oracle JDK 11 includes support for the first of a new breed of cryptographic algorithm that features improved performance, trustworthiness, and security in cloud and multitenant environments. This session describes the features and implementations of some of these algorithms: X25519 key agreement, Poly1305 authentication, and EdDSA signatures. The presentation focuses on the techniques used to develop high-performance, secure implementations of modern cryptographic algorithms in Java. No knowledge of cryptography is required, and the session should be relevant to anyone who is interested in Java performance.
Views: 426 Oracle Developers
Cryptographic Hash Functions
 
49:38
Cryptography and Network Security by Prof. D. Mukhopadhyay, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, IIT Kharagpur. For more details on NPTEL visit http://nptel.iitm.ac.in
Views: 12888 nptelhrd
Proofs in Cryptography: Lecture 11 Random Oracle Model ROM
 
10:46
Proofs in Cryptography Lecture 11 Random Oracle Model ROM ALPTEKİN KÜPÇÜ Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Engineering Koç University http://crypto.ku.edu.tr
Views: 3202 KOLT KU
Provide Scarcity - Applied Cryptography
 
02:31
This video is part of an online course, Applied Cryptography. Check out the course here: https://www.udacity.com/course/cs387.
Views: 903 Udacity
Random Oracle Reducibility (Crypto 2011)
 
15:12
Paul Baecher and Marc Fischlin Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany Abstract. We discuss a reduction notion relating the random oracles in two cryptographic schemes A and B. Basically, the random oracle of scheme B reduces to the one of scheme A if any hash function instantiation of the random oracle (possibly still oracle based) which makes A secure also makes B secure. In a sense, instantiating the random oracle in scheme B is thus not more demanding than the one for scheme A. If, in addition, the standard cryptographic assumptions for scheme B are implied by the ones for scheme A, we can conclude that scheme B actually relies on weaker assumptions. Technically, such a conclusion cannot be made given only individual proofs in the random oracle model for each scheme. The notion of random oracle reducibility immediately allows to transfer an uninstantiability result from an uninstantiable scheme B to a scheme A to which the random oracle reduces. We are nonetheless mainly interested in the other direction as a mean to establish hierarchically ordered random-oracle based schemes in terms of security assumptions. As a positive example, we consider the twin Diffie-Hellman (DH) encryption scheme of Cash et al.~(Journal of Cryptology, 2009), which has been shown to be secure under the DH assumption in the random oracle scheme. It thus appears to improve over the related hashed ElGamal encryption scheme which relies on the random oracle model and the strong DH assumption where the adversary also gets access to a decisional DH oracle. As explained above, we complement this believe by showing that the random oracle in the twin DH scheme actually reduces to the one of the hashed ElGamal encryption scheme. We finally discuss further random oracle reductions between common signature schemes like GQ, PSS, and FDH.
Views: 1283 TheIACR
How to Build Transparent Data Encryption on Oracle Standard Edition
 
08:45
View all our FREE database tutorials at http://skillbuilders.com/free-oracle-tutorials. Oracle Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) is a fantastic built-in security feature with Oracle Database Enterprise Edition. However, in this free tutorial, Oracle Master DBA John Watson will demonstrate a technique for building your own transparent data encryption - on Standard Edition!
Views: 6187 SkillBuilders
Hash Values
 
06:27
This video is about Hash Values
Views: 3107 Nick Marriott
Random Oracle - Applied Cryptography
 
00:44
This video is part of an online course, Applied Cryptography. Check out the course here: https://www.udacity.com/course/cs387.
Views: 3688 Udacity
Cryptographic Hash Functions (Contd...1)
 
50:34
Cryptography and Network Security by Prof. D. Mukhopadhyay, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, IIT Kharagpur. For more details on NPTEL visit http://nptel.iitm.ac.in
Views: 7790 nptelhrd
What is RANDOM ORACLE? What does RANDOM ORACLE mean? RANDOM ORACLE meaning & explanation
 
04:33
What is RANDOM ORACLE? What does RANDOM ORACLE mean? RANDOM ORACLE meaning - RANDOM ORACLE definition - RANDOM ORACLE explanation. Source: Wikipedia.org article, adapted under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ license. SUBSCRIBE to our Google Earth flights channel - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6UuCPh7GrXznZi0Hz2YQnQ In cryptography, a random oracle is an oracle (a theoretical black box) that responds to every unique query with a (truly) random response chosen uniformly from its output domain. If a query is repeated it responds the same way every time that query is submitted. Stated differently, a random oracle is a mathematical function chosen uniformly at random, that is, a function mapping each possible query to a (fixed) random response from its output domain. Random oracles as a mathematical abstraction were firstly used in rigorous cryptographic proofs in the 1993 publication by Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway (1993). They are typically used when the cryptographic hash functions in the method cannot be proven to possess the mathematical properties required by the proof. A system that is proven secure when every hash function is replaced by a random oracle is described as being secure in the random oracle model, as opposed to secure in the standard model of cryptography. Random oracles are typically used as an ideal replacement for cryptographic hash functions in schemes where strong randomness assumptions are needed of the hash function's output. Such a proof generally shows that a system or a protocol is secure by showing that an attacker must require impossible behavior from the oracle, or solve some mathematical problem believed hard in order to break it. Not all uses of cryptographic hash functions require random oracles: schemes that require only one or more properties having a definition in the standard model (such as collision resistance, preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, etc.) can often be proven secure in the standard model (e.g., the Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem). Random oracles have long been considered in computational complexity theory, and many schemes have been proven secure in the random oracle model, for example Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding, RSA-FDH and Probabilistic Signature Scheme. In 1986, Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir showed a major application of random oracles – the removal of interaction from protocols for the creation of signatures. In 1989, Russell Impagliazzo and Steven Rudich showed the limitation of random oracles – namely that their existence alone is not sufficient for secret-key exchange. In 1993, Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway were the first to advocate their use in cryptographic constructions. In their definition, the random oracle produces a bit-string of infinite length which can be truncated to the length desired. According to the Church–Turing thesis, no function computable by a finite algorithm can implement a true random oracle (which by definition requires an infinite description). In fact, certain artificial signature and encryption schemes are known which are proven secure in the random oracle model, but which are trivially insecure when any real function is substituted for the random oracle. Nonetheless, for any more natural protocol a proof of security in the random oracle model gives very strong evidence of the practical security of the protocol. In general, if a protocol is proven secure, attacks to that protocol must either be outside what was proven, or break one of the assumptions in the proof; for instance if the proof relies on the hardness of integer factorization, to break this assumption one must discover a fast integer factorization algorithm. Instead, to break the random oracle assumption, one must discover some unknown and undesirable property of the actual hash function; for good hash functions where such properties are believed unlikely, the considered protocol can be considered secure.
Views: 447 The Audiopedia
cryptography - Proofs of Security
 
24:39
Cryptography To get certificate subscribe: https://www.coursera.org/learn/cryptography ======================== Playlist URL: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL2jykFOD1AWb07OLBdFI2QIHvPo3aTTeu ============================ Youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/intrigano ============================ https://scsa.ge/en/online-courses/ https://www.facebook.com/cyberassociation/
Views: 1347 intrigano
Kerberos - authentication protocol
 
06:08
At 4:30: A mistake: step 3: When the file server gets the token, it "decrypts" (not "encrypts") the token with the secret key shared with TGS. In Greek mythology, Kerberos is a dog with three heads. But today I will not talk about the dog. Kerberos is an authentication protocol for client/server applications. I will demonstrate with an example how Kerberos works. Keep in mind, Kerberos implements private key encryption. Playlist: Basic Cryptography https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vk3py9M2IfE&list=PLSNNzog5eyduN6o4e6AKFHekbH5-37BdV Advanced Cryptography: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TmA2QWSLSPg&list=PLSNNzog5eydtwsdT__t5WtRgvpfMzpTc7 Please leave comments, questions and Please subscribe to my channel Many thanks, Sunny Classroom
Views: 104788 Sunny Classroom
How to check the SHA 256 Checksum
 
02:10
Keep your Integrity ;)
Views: 5252 teklek411
What's Email Hashing?
 
02:29
There is a lot of talk about “identity” in the advertising and marketing space right now with companies like Salesforce and Oracle making it easier than ever for brands to take their customer identity data (specifically email addresses) and use it to reach these customers in paid media channels likes of Google, Facebook, LiveIntent and Twitter – a process known as CRM Retargeting. But while this process has gotten easier, many brands are still asking the same question Gandalf asks Frodo about the ring: Is it secret? Is it safe? That’s why this week, we’re taking a moment to explain what “hashing” means, and how it de-identifies the email address into a secure and unique method for leveraging a brand’s CRM data. Love the awesome content you're seeing? Check out our other videos and be sure to subscribe: https://blog.liveintent.com/category/liveintentional/
Views: 1471 LiveIntent
Random Oracle Solution - Applied Cryptography
 
00:46
This video is part of an online course, Applied Cryptography. Check out the course here: https://www.udacity.com/course/cs387.
Views: 1449 Udacity
Length Extension Attack
 
11:29
Length Extension Attack on Hashed keys when keys are prefixed with the attacker controlled message
Views: 4147 global4g Security
Quantum Position Verification in the Random Oracle Model
 
18:20
Quantum Position Verification in the Random Oracle Model by Dominique Unruh. Talk at Crypto 2014.
Views: 266 TheIACR
Serge Fehr: Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
 
01:03:55
Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation in the Quantum Random Oracle Model In this presentation, I will first recall the Fiat-Shamir transformation, which is an important design principle for non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and for digital signature schemes. In order to rigorously analyze the security of this transformation, one typically considers an idealized model, the so-called random oracle model (ROM), which treats cryptographic hash functions as ideal objects. It is well known that (in the ROM) the Fiat-Shamir transformation preserves the security properties one cares about. However, the proof for this result breaks down in the quantum setting where the attacker is allowed to make superposition queries to the random oracle. Indeed, the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation against a quantum attack was largely open; only some limited results were know, and some negative claims were actually made in the literature. Having set up the stage, I will then discuss our recent result, which shows full-fledged security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation against quantum attacks, i.e., in the so-called quantum ROM. I will give some high-level intuition for our result, but will also go through the technical proof, which after all is quite simple. In the last part, I will briefly introduce a modification to a security definition for interactive proofs, which allows us to relativize a certain negative result, and which then makes our result on the Fiat-Shamir transformation relevant for a larger class of schemes.
Views: 92 QuICS
14.412 Simple Hash Join
 
08:57
My book "Patterns in Data Management" is now available both as an ebook or a print book (with color graphics!). See: http://amzn.to/1Ts3rwx This book is not a standard textbook on database techniques. This book was written extending and complementing preexisting educational videos (including this one). Video for my inverted classroom "Database Systems". The complete list of videos, slides, and additional material is (will be) available at http://datenbankenlernen.de Computer Science, Saarland University: Bachelor (in German): http://www.cs.uni-saarland.de/index.p... Master (in English): http://www.cs.uni-saarland.de/index.p... Ph.D./Grad School: http://gradschool.cs.uni-saarland.de/
Computer Hacking - Hash padding attacks
 
03:23:04
https://twitch.tv/justinsteven Tonight we're looking at hash padding attacks and enjoying Justin's general crypto terribleness.
Views: 718 Justin Steven
Proofs in Cryptography: Lecture 5 Pseudo Random Generators
 
09:47
Proofs in Cryptography Lecture 5 Pseudo Random Generators ALPTEKİN KÜPÇÜ Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Engineering Koç University http://crypto.ku.edu.tr
Views: 2999 KOLT KU
Kerberos in Hindi – Network Authentication Protocol, KDC, AS, TGS
 
10:53
Kerberos in Hindi – Network Authentication Protocol, KDC, AS, TGS Like FB Page - https://www.facebook.com/Easy-Engineering-Classes-346838485669475/ Complete Data Structure Videos - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSna11Vc54-abg33JtVZiiMfg Complete Java Programming Lectures - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnbL_fSaqiYpPh-KwNCavjIr Previous Years Solved Questions of Java - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnajIVnIOOJTNdLT-TqiOjUu Complete DBMS Video Lectures - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnYZjtUDQ5-9siMc2d8YeoB4 Previous Year Solved DBMS Questions - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnaPiMXU2bmuo3SWjNUykbg6 SQL Programming Tutorials - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnb7av5opUF2p3Xv9CLwOfbq PL-SQL Programming Tutorials - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnadFpRMvtA260-3-jkIDFaG Control System Complete Lectures - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnbvRNepz74GGafF-777qYw4
Views: 100994 Easy Engineering Classes
Cryptography Lesson #2 - Adversaries and Games
 
08:01
In this tutorial, we will give an overview of how games and adversaries are used to evaluate cryptographic schemes. We will focus on how games are structured, and give an example of how an adversary might play a game.
Views: 16345 Ryan Kral
Weak Collision Resistance Solution - Applied Cryptography
 
01:42
This video is part of an online course, Applied Cryptography. Check out the course here: https://www.udacity.com/course/cs387.
Views: 1236 Udacity
Blockchain - The block structure
 
02:51
Blockchain - The block structure Watch more videos at https://www.tutorialspoint.com/videotutorials/index.htm Lecture By: Mr. Parth Joshi, Tutorials Point India Private Limited
Physically Uncloneable Functions in the Universal Composition Framework
 
18:22
Christina Brzuska, Marc Fischlin, Heike Schröder, and Stefan Katzenbeisser Darmstadt University of Technology and Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt, Germany Abstract. Recently, there have been numerous works about hardware-assisted cryptographic protocols, either improving previous constructions in terms of efficiency, or in terms of security. In particular, many suggestions use Canetti's universal composition (UC) framework to model hardware tokens and to derive schemes with strong security guarantees in the UC framework. In this paper, we augment this approach by considering Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) in the UC framework. Interestingly, when doing so, one encounters several peculiarities specific to PUFs, such as the intrinsic non-programmability of such functions. Using our UC notion of PUFs, we then devise efficient UC-secure protocols for basic tasks like oblivious transfer, commitments, and key exchange. It turns out that designing PUF-based protocols is fundamentally different than for other hardware tokens. For one part this is because of the non-programmability. But also, since the functional behavior is unpredictable even for the creator of the PUF, this causes an asymmetric situation in which only the party in possession of the PUF has full access to the secrets.
Views: 1457 TheIACR
Proofs in Cryptography: Lecture 2 Probabilistic and Game based Security Definitions
 
07:27
Proofs in Cryptography Lecture 2 Probabilistic and Game based Security Definitions ALPTEKİN KÜPÇÜ Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Engineering Koç University http://crypto.ku.edu.tr
Views: 2187 KOLT KU
Random Oracles in the Real World
 
06:17
Paper by Gaëtan Leurent, Thomas Peyrin, presented by Gaëtan Leurent at Eurocrypt 2018 Rump Session.
Views: 71 TheIACR
DEFCON 19: Cryptographic Oracles
 
48:30
Invest in IT Startups with as little as 10$ (or bitcoin) and watch your money grow every second! Withdraw instantly every $1 or 0.01BTC! http://bit.ly/1bQdMOQ
Views: 1528 HackersSecurity
To Hash or Not to Hash Again? (In)Differentiability Resu ...
 
19:40
Talk at crypto 2012. Authors: Yevgeniy Dodis, Thomas Ristenpart, John P. Steinberger, Stefano Tessaro. See http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=24297
Views: 272 TheIACR
Diffie Hellman Key Exchange in Hindi for Symmetric Key Encryption System – With Example
 
05:56
Diffie Hellman Key Exchange in Hindi for Symmetric Key Encryption System – With Example Like FB Page - https://www.facebook.com/Easy-Engineering-Classes-346838485669475/ Complete Data Structure Videos - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSna11Vc54-abg33JtVZiiMfg Complete Java Programming Lectures - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnbL_fSaqiYpPh-KwNCavjIr Previous Years Solved Questions of Java - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnajIVnIOOJTNdLT-TqiOjUu Complete DBMS Video Lectures - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnYZjtUDQ5-9siMc2d8YeoB4 Previous Year Solved DBMS Questions - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnaPiMXU2bmuo3SWjNUykbg6 SQL Programming Tutorials - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnb7av5opUF2p3Xv9CLwOfbq PL-SQL Programming Tutorials - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnadFpRMvtA260-3-jkIDFaG Control System Complete Lectures - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLV8vIYTIdSnbvRNepz74GGafF-777qYw4
Padding Solution - Applied Cryptography
 
01:37
This video is part of an online course, Applied Cryptography. Check out the course here: https://www.udacity.com/course/cs387.
Views: 1635 Udacity
Hash Func and Oracle Method
 
09:36
The Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/TheNewEdge0 My Blog to download books: https://thenewedge0.blogspot.com.eg/2017/07/blog-post.html
Views: 16 The New Edge
IND CCA secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism in the Quantum Random Oracle Model, Revisited
 
17:11
Paper by Haodong Jiang and Zhenfeng Zhang and Long Chen and Hong Wang and Zhi Ma, presented at Crypto 2018. See https://iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=28808
Views: 150 TheIACR
Random oracle
 
05:40
If you find our videos helpful you can support us by buying something from amazon. https://www.amazon.com/?tag=wiki-audio-20 Random oracle In cryptography, a random oracle is an oracle (a theoretical black box) that responds to every unique query with a (truly) random response chosen uniformly from its output domain.If a query is repeated it responds the same way every time that query is submitted. -Video is targeted to blind users Attribution: Article text available under CC-BY-SA image source in video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxi-q8SjbUU
Views: 456 WikiAudio